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THE RELEVANCE OF AFRICAN CULTURE IN BUILDING MODERN 
INSTITUTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR LEGAL PLURALISM 
SEMAHAGN G. ABEBE* 
INTRODUCTION 
The clash of civilizations between the emergence of modern conceptions 
of democracy and principles of human rights on the one hand and the 
entrenched cultural traits in Africa on the other hand has left the continent at a 
crossroads in relation to the fundamental alternative forms of governance 
available to move Africa forward. Due to the fact that the colonial legacy has 
seriously undermined the relevance of traditional institutions that hitherto 
dominated the African way of life, the fate of such institutions has been put on 
the edge of peril.1 Post-colonial state-building in Africa has been largely 
undertaken under the guise of transplanting a European institutional system 
that has made the state in Africa basically a neo-colonial one.2 The 
fundamental change of the termination of the colonial legacy is in effect the 
replacement of colonial powers with new local elite leaders. Since the removal 
of the shackles of colonialism, there has always been a debate on the political, 
social, and legal framework needed to bring about change in Africa. Primarily, 
the new elites of Africa, in a bid to bring about speedy prosperity to the region, 
aimed at eliminating traditional African custom and traditions.3 The new elites 
claim that African traditional institutions are either repressive or that their 
legitimacy and role has been compromised by colonial powers.4 
The alternative state formation endeavored in Africa is largely 
transplanting European style governance. Some African countries such as 
 
* LL.M., University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands; LL.M., University of Goettingen, 
Germany; Doctor Juris, Faculty of Law, University of Goettingen, Germany; Bank of Ireland Post 
Doctoral Fellow, Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland, Galway. 
 1. Forms of traditional institutions in Africa include chiefs, clan leaders, kings, clan or 
chief assemblies, accountability structures, traditional justice systems, and, additionally, the 
society’s whole belief system. 
 2. Archie Mafeje, Democratic Governance and New Democracy in Africa: Agenda for the 
Future, Presentation Before the African Forum for Envisioning Africa 6 (Apr. 26–29, 2002) 
(transcript available from the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, available at 
http://www.uneca.org/itca/governance/Documents/Archie Mafeje2.pdf.) 
 3. See id. at 9–10. 
 4. Id. at 4. 
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Tanzania and Ethiopia even resorted to the socialist system of government.5 
Due to the lack of objective situations in Africa to transplant either the liberal 
or socialist packages of government, the transformation of African governance 
has been largely characterized by repression, corruption, and inefficiency as 
well as the inability to address poverty and conflicts.6 In light of such failure of 
state formation in the region, researchers and policymakers are wondering how 
to take African governance forward. Particularly, there has been an increasing 
debate on the role of traditional institutions in advancing the African 
democratization process. Though the total exclusion of traditional institutions 
had been practiced since the end of the era of colonialism, the contemporary 
trend primarily grants some room to African traditional institutions in various 
forms.7 Since the African society is deeply traditional, the role of traditional 
custom and institutions has paramount importance. Particularly, the role of 
traditional institutions is highly influential in rural communities where the 
visibility of modern institutions is largely absent. Since there are not 
institutions such as local administration, police, or courts of law in remote 
African communities, people resort to traditional leaders such as chiefs, local 
councils, and religious leaders. In other words, whether formal institutions 
officially recognize traditional institutions or not, traditional institutions 
continue to have their own impact on the foreseeable future in Africa. 
In light of their continued relevance, the viable option for improving 
governance in Africa is accommodating traditional custom and institutions 
within the existing state structure. A system of legal pluralism that allows 
traditional institutions to discharge their responsibility would greatly improve 
problems of governance in Africa. But there is a different critique forwarded 
against the accommodation of traditional institutions within the modern state 
structure. One of the critiques directed against the role of traditional 
institutions is that they are repressive and not compatible with modern liberal 
values. This assertion has its own merits and its own pitfalls. In light of the 
hereditary nature of power holders in traditional institutions and the harmful 
traditional practices that discriminate against women, traditional institutions 
are at odds with modern liberal values. On the contrary, however, the fact that 
those traditional institutions are participatory, consensual, transparent, and 
changing makes them not necessarily against the ideals of liberalism. 
In light of such continued debate on the relevance and compatibility of 
traditional institutions to the modern state institutions in Africa, this Article 
attempts to highlight the significance of traditional institutions to improving 
governance in Africa and to prospects for improving the democratic features of 
traditional institutions to meet the demands of modern institutional 
 
 5. Id. at 8. 
 6. See id. at 7 (enumerating various deficiencies in the typical neo-colonial African state). 
 7. Id. at 10. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] THE RELEVANCE OF AFRICAN CULTURE 431 
development. The Article in particular argues that dismissing the relevance of 
traditional institutions by claiming they are incompatible to modern 
institutional values is not only inaccurate, but it also may further alienate the 
role of traditional institutions in Africa. The Article addresses divergent issues 
that help put the issue in perspective. The Article consists of three parts. Part I 
of the Article discuses the debate on the universalist versus relativist approach 
in relation to democratic and human rights principles and the impact of the 
ongoing debate on the nature of governance needed in Africa. Part II of the 
Article continues to highlight the features of African traditional institutions 
that have wider relevance to the principles of modern democracy. The last Part 
of the Article argues for the emergence of a system of legal pluralism whereby 
the formal and informal institutions flourish side-by-side until the informal 
systems are gradually integrated into the formal institutional system. 
I.  THE DEBATE ON UNIVERSALISM VERSUS CULTURAL RELATIVISM AND THE 
WAY FORWARD IN THE CONTEXT OF AFRICA 
Though there are different views on the definition and scope of democracy, 
the Western liberal democratic model has emerged as the uncontested form of 
modern governance. Particularly, the turn of events after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall seems to have greatly changed the democratic demography of the world. 
The dynamics of political changes since 1990 have resulted in a resurgence of 
liberal democracy that triumphed during the Cold War to the extent of 
compelling Francis Fukuyama, in The End of History and the Last Man, to 
argue that the Cold War marked the endpoint of mankind’s ideological 
evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final 
form of human government.8 Furthermore, the horizon of democracy has been 
expanded since December 2010 when the vibrant power of democracy once 
again dismantled the age-old repressive regimes in North African and Arab 
countries that were living under the veil of “Islamic values.” The revolutions 
that have rocked the Middle East once again proved democracy is not 
something reserved to Western societies. In light of such unprecedented moves 
towards democratization and freedom, liberalism has been largely treated as 
“universally valid and everlasting.”9 
Though this spread of democracy has been viewed as appropriate within 
the liberal ideological context of the West, the administration of democratic 
governance is problematic in African societies that have  different historical 
backgrounds.10  In the case of Muslim, Asian, and African countries, there has 
been an argument that liberal democracy cannot be transplanted into their 
 
 8. See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 36–37 (1992). 
 9. Mafeje, supra note 2, at 11. 
 10. See Sammy Adelman, Constitutionalism, Pluralism and Democracy in Africa, 42 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 73, 78 (1998). 
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societies because of the “speciality” of their cultures.11 Defenders of Asian 
values have claimed that Western-style liberal democracy is neither suitable to 
nor compatible with Confucian East Asia, where collective welfare, a sense of 
duty, and other principles of Confucian moral philosophy are deeply rooted.12 
For two decades, African scholars have questioned the role of democracy in 
Africa.13 The debate is particularly intense as to the role of traditional 
institutions in African democratic transformation. As scholars recognize, 
”there is a widely held perception that democracy . . . is inappropriate for 
Africa as it is antithetical to African values and culture.”14 Their claim is this: 
African democracy is a different species of democracy, which has roots in 
African culture and history. African societies are plagued by ethnic, tribal, and 
religious conflicts which can be solved not by Western-style liberal 
democracy, but within the framework of the traditional African institutions of 
consensus-building, elder mediation, and conciliation.15 
According to this assertion, since African communities from the village 
upwards have traditionally decided their course through free discussion, they 
have much to learn from their own traditions and to teach others about the true 
meaning and spirit of democracy.16 Due to such claims of peculiarities, some 
argue that liberalism is at odds with African culture and tradition.17 There is 
even a “widespread tendency to equate democracy with liberal capitalism in a 
way that reinforces the cultural imperialism to which the developing world has 
long been subjected.”18 In light of this, one of the prominent leaders of the pan-
African movement, Julius Nyerere, has claimed that “Western 
constitutionalism represented a foreign element which had no place in African 
history, tradition or practice and that notions of individual rights or the 
separation of powers were incomprehensible to the African masses.”19 
 
 11. Id. at 86; Chong-Min Park & Doh Chull Shin, Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support 
for Democracy? The Case of South Korea 5 (Asian Barometer Project Office, Working Paper No. 
26, 2004), available at http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/ 
no.26.pdf. 
 12. Park & Shin, supra note 11, at 5. 
 13. See Mafeje, supra note 2, at 12. 
 14. Kristina A. Bentley, Reflections on Perceived Conflicts Between Culture and Democracy 
in Africa: The South African Case 1 (Nov. 2005) (draft paper), available at http://www.hsrc.ac. 
za/research/output/outputDocuments/3514_Bentley_Reflectionsonperceivedconflicts.pdf. 
 15. Alemayehu G. Mariam, The Democracy Before Democracy in Africa, PAMBAZUKA 
NEWS (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/61799. 
 16. Bentley, supra note 14 (citing Kofi Annan, Africa’s thirst for democracy, THE INT’L 
HERALD TRIB. (Dec. 5, 2000)). 
 17. See Adelman, supra note 10, 77–78. 
 18. Id. at 75. 
 19. Id. at 77. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] THE RELEVANCE OF AFRICAN CULTURE 433 
But contrary to the socio-political realties in the continent, post-
decolonization African leaders resorted to a liberal constitution-making 
process that aimed at building a modern state. Some of the African countries 
had also resorted to a Marxism-Leninism model of state formation. Many of 
the newly independent African countries installed the state model of the British 
parliamentary system or the French strong presidential system.20 The liberal 
constitutions that have been enshrined in many of the post-colonization 
African countries provides for free and fair elections, separation of powers 
principles, protections of human rights, freedom of opinion, transparency, and 
accountability.21 Furthermore, “[t]hese constitutions have also taken many 
forms and sought to address a range of social, political, ethnic, tribal and 
regional problems, suggesting the existence of a high degree of pluralism.”22 
Based on such constitutional systems, formal political institutions such as 
parliament, administrative institutions, the judiciary, and other relevant organs 
have been put in place.23 Those countries that resorted to Marxism as state 
ideology, on the other hand, argued that “liberalism was incompatible with 
their developmental needs, for which a strong state was required.”24 But 
attempts to adopt such liberal democracy or Marxist state models in Africa 
succeeded only in producing one-party dictatorships under a veneer of 
European bureaucratic structures and procedures, which is neither African nor 
European.25 It is believed that “African society has suffered a rupture and crisis 
of thought and culture as a result of the encounter with liberalism.”26 This is 
because the path to development through the liberal ideological context of the 
West is much “more problematic in societies with different histories.”27 
The interaction between liberal values and traditional ways of life in Africa 
seems to have created some kind of anomaly due to the differences of the two 
systems in societal values. The values rendered by liberalism are basically 
divergent from the entrenched cultural traits prevalent in Africa. Liberalism 
considers the individual an entity whereas African thought “respects 
individuality but abhors individualism.”28  Liberalism concentrates on 
individual materialistic concerns while African society focuses on the material 
and spiritual welfare of the community.  Apparently, the system of 
 
 20. Elliot P. Skinner, African Political Cultures and the Problems of Government, 2 AFR. 
STUD. Q. 17, 18–19 (1998). 
 21. Akwasi Aidoo, Africa: Democracy without Human Rights?, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 703, 709 
(1993). 
 22. Adelman, supra note 10, at 73. 
 23. Id. at 75 n.4. 
 24. Id. at 77. 
 25. Mafeje, supra note 2, at 4. 
 26. Harvey Sindima, Liberalism and African Culture, 21 J. BLACK STUD. 190, 190 (1990). 
 27. Adelman, supra note 10 , at 78. 
 28. Sindima, supra note 26, at 190. 
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transplantation of Western legal and political ideals was made by way of 
disregarding the well-entrenched, informal traditional values that guided the 
lives of ordinary Africans for centuries. Unlike the experience of other 
development models such as Japanese and the Turks, post-colonial Africans 
decided to culturally Westernize without economically modernizing 
themselves.29 This unmerited transplantation of systems has resulted in a series 
of discrepancies between the formal and informal system in Africa. 
Incompatibility between the visible and the invisible institutions has led to the 
simultaneous existence of different rules in relation to property rights laws and 
customs that lead to conflict, which usually results in different notions of rights 
and obligations.30 In addition to this, the incoherence of the two systems has 
created “different socioeconomic spaces and citizenships, characterized by 
exclusion, corruption and patronage . . . [which] . . . result in the application of 
different ways of conflict resolution and decision-making . . . deepen[ing] 
conflicting relationships rather than sustainable peace.”31 
There is no any easy way out of this paradox. Adhering exclusively either 
to the modern systems of government or to the traditional institutions is costly 
to African governance. Since the modern institutions already have wider 
appeal due to the impact of globalization, African states cannot ignore the 
relevance of such institutions. In addition to this, not only is it doubtful 
whether the existing traditional institutions are in a position to efficiently 
regulate complex social and economic relations in modern society, the  
colonial heritage has seriously weakened the role of traditional institutions.32 In 
the same token, African societies could not entirely depend on modern 
institutions. Not only are the modern institutions installed in Africa 
incompatible with the social and economic realities in Africa, but the 
institutions also are characterized by inefficiency and corruption, and they are 
only visible in urban centres.33 The large majority of rural Africans still depend 
on traditional institutions for their day-to-day life. In light of such multiple 
institutional developments in the region, it seems Africa could transform its 
challenges of democratic governance through integrating the old system with 
the new legal order. 
 
 29. Ali A. Mazrui, Who Killed Democracy in Africa? Clues of the Past, Concerns of the 
Future, 9 DEV. POL’Y MGMT. NETWORK BULL. 15, 17 (2002). 
 30. HUM. SCI. RES. COUNCIL, RECONCILING AFRICA’S FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONS OF 
GOVERNANCE: A NEW APPROACH TO INSTITUTION BUILDING 8 (Feb. 20, 2009), [hereinafter 
FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONS], http://www.hsrc.ac.za/News-document-1120.phtml. 
 31. Id. at 9. 
 32. See Sindima, supra note 26, at 193 (providing, as an example, the loss of control 
suffered by traditional African chiefs in their own societies). 
 33. Bonny Ibhawoh, Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy 
of Human Rights in the African State, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 838, 845 (2000). 
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The way forward to resolve the conflict between formal and informal 
institutions in Africa seems to be reconciling the application of traditional 
institutions with modern systems of governance. In finding an appropriate 
balance between the two systems, it is primarily inappropriate to assume that 
African traditional systems are entirely incompatible with the values of liberal 
democracy.  In light of the universality of democratic values, it is erroneous to 
assume that every aspect of liberal values are alien to Africa just because they 
are not upheld, practiced, or expressed in Western forms.  In fact, though 
liberal values seem to be alien to the African culture, there are African 
traditional elements such as social justice and leadership accountability that 
can serve as fertile ground to grow the seeds of basic liberal values.34 Rather, 
the challenges of adopting democracy in Africa are of approach rather than 
mere adoption of liberal values. Since many of the African countries attempted 
to implant a liberal system by completely disregarding African values, African 
constitutional development remains elusive. 
Though such official discouragement of cultural values has weakened 
many of the rich cultures in the continent, there are still numerous traditional 
values that, if nurtured and supported, could serve as sound frameworks for 
transforming values of democracy in Africa. Traditional values could support 
the development of democracy because they still have significant appeal to the 
African masses.35 It has now become clear that “contemporary debates . . . 
[and] . . . transitions to democracy in Africa suggest that viable democratic 
alternatives can emerge only with the consent of the African masses.”36 In 
other words, the most viable venue to take African democracy forward is 
through the recognition of diverse forms of traditional institutions to which the 
majority of African people prescribe. In light of such significance, the fusion 
of traditional and modern institutions is likely to lead to a democratic system 
that is more compatible with African socioeconomic realities by integrating the 
parallel socioeconomic spaces.37 In light of these invisible hands of culture 
controlling the lives of ordinary Africans, the way forward for African 
constitutional development is to search out mechanisms to transform African 
cultural institutions rather than to leave them to extinction. 
 
 34. See, e.g., Apollos O. Nwauwa, Concepts of Democracy and Democratization in Africa 
Revisited, in DEMOCRACY & GLOBALIZATION, (Charles L. Nieman ed., 2005), available at 
http://upress.kent.edu/Nieman/Concepts _of_Democracy.htm. 
 35. Adelman, supra note 10, at 80. 
 36. Id. at 86. 
 37. Id. 
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II.  THE ROLE OF AFRICAN TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND THE NEED TO 
ADAPT TO MODERNITY 
As has been indicated earlier, because of the legacy of colonialism and 
Westernized education systems, there has never been a coherent development 
of institutions in Africa. The primary institutions of governance in Africa are 
those formal structures which are state-sponsored institutions inherited from 
the colonial legacy. On the other hand, there are traditional institutions that 
entail pre-colonial forms of governance with different forms of traditional 
authority systems. Though many of these pre-colonial systems have either been 
destroyed or incorporated into colonial systems of governance, traditional 
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa remain very influential elements in society. 
Traditional chiefs in particular have tremendous power in many parts of 
Africa, whether they have been officially recognized or not. 
In many of the African societies, different traditional institutions still play 
a significant role. For instance, “in many pre-colonial African societies, 
community-wide gatherings known variously as pitso (Lesotho), kgotla 
(Botswana), shir (Somalia), baraza (Kenya), and many other names, offered an 
opportunity for a wide array of community members to voice their opinions on 
community affairs and participate in consensus-based decision making.”38 
According to a report from the Human Sciences Research Council and 
Pennsylvania State University on Africa’s institutions of governance, in the 
southern part of Ethiopia, “the Borana and the Gujii have administered 
themselves according to the traditional socio-political and economic 
organization known as the Gadaa system based on age-grade. It has . . . been 
essentially an egalitarian and democratic institution which had also been 
practiced in a similar fashion among the . . . Sidama and the Gedeo . . . .”39 
While the Gadaa system used to operate smoothly, transferring power between 
incoming and outgoing Gadaa groups, “following the creation of the empire . . 
. the traditional institution was officially disrupted and dismantled, but has 
survived the centralization systems of governance of the past Ethiopian 
regimes at the local level.”40 Despite this attempted dismantling, the Gadaa 
system demonstrates its legal significance “in the establishment of property 
rights, allocation of resources as well as in the prevention and resolutions of 
conflicts.”41 
In conjunction with the Gadaa, the Borana-Gujii council of elders, called 
the Hayyu, “play a very important role in settling inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic 
 
 38. Carolyn Logan, Traditional Leaders in Modern Africa: Can Democracy and the Chief 
Co-Exist? 3 (Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 93, 2008), available at http://afrobarometer.org/ 
index.php. 
 39. FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 22. 
 40. Id. at 23. 
 41. Id. 
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conflicts and disputes.”42 When group conflicts arise between two ethnic 
entities, the council of Oromo elders and Gadaa deliberate with the elders and 
chiefs of the non-Oromo ethnic groups regarding the matter “for days and 
decide on compensation usually paid in cattle to the victimized group.”43 
In western Ethiopia, “the Anuak and the Nuer mediated disputes and 
conflicts through the office of the chiefs and elders.” In particular, the Nuer 
prevent blood revenge between different groups by designating an individual 
the “leopard skin chief.”44 This individual “provides sanctuary to a murderer 
and attempts to negotiate compensation with the victim’s lineage.”45Similarly, 
the Anuak resolve conflicts through the mediation of elders.46 The Gurages 
employ traditional conflict resolution mechanisms referred to “as Yajoka and 
Gordanna (Shengo council), which have been in existence for centuries and 
are still widely used by the local population.”47 
In Somali communities, traditional institutions play a significant role in the 
absence of a functioning government in the country. Particularly, traditional 
institutions play an important role in self-autonomous regions of Somaliland 
and Puntland. In Somaliland, “the first category of traditional institutions 
consists of the Sultans, who are senior leaders drawn from major clans.48 
Under them are Boqor and Garaad representing the major clans.”49 “The 
Boqor and Garrad are the clans’ highest authority. They mobilize and chair 
meetings, and are the custodians of the Xeer (customary law).”50 These 
traditional institutions are not unaffiliated with the democratic government, but 
“their appointment is decided on consensus (Pastoral Democracy).”51 At the 
sub-clan level, the Caaqils are paid by the government and “function as a link 
between government and local community.”52 In Kenya also, traditional 
institutions play an important role. One of the important institutions, the Kaya 
Elders of Mijikeda, are communities living near Mombasa. This institution 
plays an important role in the allocation of land, the management of resources, 
and dispute resolution.53 There are also numerous traditional institutions in the 
western and southern parts of Africa.54 
 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 25. 
 45. FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 25. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 26. 
 48. Id. at 28–29. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, at 29. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 33. 
 54. Id. at 32–33. 
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Despite the establishment of formal institutions in Africa, such informal 
traditional institutions remain significant. Studies reveal traditional institutions 
“still play an important role in the lives of many Africans,” particularly in their 
“pre-eminent role as mediators of violent conflict.”55 Traditional institutions 
are also used as mechanisms for ensuring equitable access to land in rural areas 
and for moderating inequality.56 In light of this, traditional institutions cater to 
rural populations, often alienated by the official state government.57 Since 
lower-level chiefs and village leaders live in rural communities, they better 
represent the interests of their communities than state government officials.58 
According to one study, “popular perceptions of [informal] traditional leaders 
are slightly more positive than those for elected leaders.”59 In fact, “the formal 
institutions of the modern state, those that regulate the structure of polity, 
property rights and contracting cannot be effective if they disregard or 
contradict the customary rules of the traditional institutions, which govern the 
lives and livelihood of large segments of the population.”60 By failing to 
engage the traditional institutions adhered to by large segments of the 
population, formal institutions have remained ineffective in coordinating 
policy and resources with broad social interests, preventing conflicts, and 
promoting synergy in state-society relations.61 In particular, the fact that the 
African state could not guarantee access to justice for large portions of the 
population due to modern institutional weakness means that the role of 
traditional institutions is indispensable. The “effective legitimacy [of 
traditional institutions] within their respective societies could certainly offer an 
opportunity to develop new power structures better articulated with official 
institutions of power and offer a counterweight in some instances.”62 
African traditional institutions also have their own democratic features, 
albeit with some limitations. Scholars recognize that “[i]n pre-colonial Africa, 
many liberties co-existed, including liberty of religion . . . liberty of 
association, freedom of expression, the right to participate in affairs of the 
 
 55. See Logan, supra note 38, at 1. 
 56. Kidane Mengisteab, Reconciling Africa’s Fragmented Institutions of Governance: Is 
Somaliland Charting a New Path?, in FAITH, CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND PEACE IN THE 
HORN OF AFRICA 179, 180 (Sthlm Policy Group ed., 2009). 
 57. Jerry Bungu, Making Use of Traditional Institutions in Modern African States, 
MMEGIONLINE (July 17, 2009), http://www.mmegi.bw/index.php?sid=6&aid=16&dir=2009/July/ 
Friday17. 
 58. See Mengisteab, supra note 56, at 182. 
 59. See Logan, supra note 38, at 1. 
 60. See Bungu, supra note 57. 
 61. See Mengisteab, supra note 56, at 185; see FRAGMENTED INSTITUTIONS, supra note 30, 
at 2, 8–9. 
 62. Jacques Frémont, Legal Pluralism, Customary Law and Human Rights in Francophone 
African Countries, 40 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 149, 156 (2009). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2013] THE RELEVANCE OF AFRICAN CULTURE 439 
state, and freedom of circulation.”63 “[A]ll over Africa, the people essentially 
form a community-based culture” characterized by “[s]ocial harmony, 
solidarity and community values.”64 Though the individual under African 
culture is only addressed in light of the wider communal values, it could be 
argued that there are elements of democracy in some of the cultural practices 
expressed in social associations such as the councils of elders, mutual aid 
organizations, and procedures dealing with conflicts and crime.65 Though the 
African traditional institutions are primarily concerned with communal 
welfare, this does not mean that there is a tendency to disregard individual 
preferences. Rather, as Menkiti argues, “whereas the African view [of society] 
asserts an ontological independence to human society, and moves from society 
to individuals, the Western view moves instead from individuals to society.”66 
“For the African, it is the respect for life and community that is a priority” that 
“focuses on the material and spiritual welfare of the community and 
individual.”67 
The other fundamental feature of traditional institutions is “a decentralized 
participatory decision-making system, which allows the empowerment of local 
communities to control local decisions and matters of their self-governance.”68 
“The relatively centralized chieftaincy systems are generally more 
decentralized than the often autocratic post-colonial state.”69 In light of this, 
“[t]he chiefs often delegate their powers to designate underchiefs” and “[t]hey 
share power with the sorcerers, witches and magicians who also hold 
hereditary titles and are in charge of the magico-religious dimensions of 
power.”70 In addition to this, 
[i]n many places, the chief is counselled by a privy council which advises him 
with regard to applying the rules flowing from ancestral traditions and helps in 
assuring that the decisions are taken in coherence with lineage. . . . The 
equilibrium and existence of such counterweights within any given society are 
typical of the contemporary elements of democracy.71 
 
 63. Id. at 159. 
 64. Id. at 150. 
 65. Siegfried Pausewang , Kjetil Tronvoll  & Lovise Aalen, Democratization in Ethiopia, 
Some Notes on Theory and Methodology, in ETHIOPIA SINCE THE DERG: A DECADE OF 
DEMOCRATIC PRETENSION AND PERFORMANCE 3 (Siegfried Pausewang et al. eds., 2002). 
 66. Ifeanyl A. Menkiti, Person and Community in African Traditional Court, in AFRICAN 
PHILOSOPHY: AN INTRODUCTION 180 (Richard A. Wright ed., 1984). 
 67. See Sindima, supra note 26, at 190. 
 68. Mengisteab, supra note 56, at 187. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Frémont, supra note 62, at 156. 
 71. Id. 
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African traditional institutions also have village councils where direct 
democracy is exercised.72 In many African communities, there are periodic 
public meetings that deliberate on the major social and economic issues of the 
village.73 All such democratic exercises are compatible with the modern 
democratic conception.74 
Traditional institutions in African society also resolve conflicts through 
negotiations. Many aspects of traditional institutions involve communal 
justice, which is an integral part of the principles of fundamental justice.75 
Negotiated political solutions work in traditional institutions to resolve ethnic 
conflicts, but they can also be applied to mitigate conflicts among state 
political parties.76 The “consensus-based system of decision-making” allows 
respect for dissent, protects minority interests, resolves conflicts and promotes 
communication between political parties.77 In particular, “[t]he end result [in a 
traditional justice system] is based on sacrifice as well as just and fair 
compensation.”78 The principle of accountability is also an important feature of 
the traditional justice system in Africa. The fact that traditional courts are open 
to the public increases accountability and builds confidence in the system.79 
Additionally, in traditional institutions, “litigants speak [local] languages, 
while modern justice is rendered and administered in French or English.”80 
Thus, the traditional institutions of governance are more accessible, readily 
understood, and participatory.81 Individuals from rural areas do feel foreign in 
a justice system that “applies complex, modern norms rather than well 
understood norms and principles aimed at preserving cohesion, harmony and 
collective values.”82 
Despite the value of traditional institutions, the development of a system 
that facilitates the development of traditional institutions poses numerous 
challenges. Primarily, the crude implementation of western institutions without 
consideration for traditional African institutions has seriously undermined the 
prospect for the development of traditional institutions. The fact that this 
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importation has completely disregarded traditional systems has not only 
weakened the traditional institutions but has harmed democratic transformation 
on the continent. In addition, since the development of traditional institutions 
“was blocked by the combined effects of Africa’s colonial experience and 
subsequent neglect by the post colonial state, traditional African democratic 
values and their conflict resolution mechanisms remained largely confined to 
the local level.”83 Globalization also erodes the value of traditional institutions. 
Since the impact of western culture is reaching the most inaccessible parts of 
the continent, the young generation increasingly ignores the value of traditional 
institutions.84 Considering the world is dominated by cultural, economic, and 
political ideologies of Western society, preserving traditional institutions has 
become more difficult. The attitude of African ruling elites towards traditional 
institutions presents another obstacle.85 Though many of the African dictators 
reject democratizing the African state under the pretext that Western values are 
incompatible with African culture, many of the ruling elites consider 
traditional institutions a threat to their power.86  Because of this threat, many 
African regimes deny the official recognition of traditional institutions.87 
The other challenge to the development of traditional institutions is related 
to problems of accountability and discriminatory practices within some 
customs in Africa. “Viewed from the perspective of contemporary principles of 
democracy, the formal mechanisms of accountability in the centralised African 
traditional institutions are rather weak since chiefs often combine executive 
and judicial powers.”88 Additionally, “women and young adults, though not 
formally prohibited by rule, are often presumed to be represented by their 
husbands and fathers, respectively, and are customarily excluded from 
participating in the decision-making assemblies.”89 Despite the apparent 
prevalence of harmful practices in many of the African traditions, there are 
also tremendous improvements. Because of the increasing adoption of 
international human rights principles in many of the African countries, 
traditional practices have changed over the last few decades.90 Further, as 
modernization extends into rural families, traditional leaders are forced to 
adapt by abandoning outdated practices.91 
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III.  IN DEFENSE OF LEGAL PLURALISM IN AFRICA 
As previously indicated, the African constitutional system has faced 
conflict between the formal and informal systems of institution. Though a 
return solely to traditional institutions is impossible, “African culture, history 
and tradition still inform people’s lives in the twenty-first century.”92 Although 
African countries have adopted Western liberal constitutional systems, 
traditional institutions remain entrenched. Because of the significance of these 
institutions in Africa, political elites, academics, activists, and chiefs 
themselves “debate the proper position of traditional authorities in society at 
length.”93 The issue of reconciling traditional authorities with modern political 
systems “becomes particularly acute at the local level, where . . . [traditional 
institutions] . . . exert the most influence on the daily lives of Africans, and 
where the contest with government authorities for resources and 
responsibilities is most intense.”94 
In light of the contentions between the two systems, there is a need to 
rethink the role of African traditional institutions within the current democratic 
setup. To achieve the goal of accommodating the two systems, African legal 
systems need to adopt principles of legal pluralism whereby the formal and 
informal systems work together to achieve transitional democracy. Rather than 
forcing Western liberal values on unwilling populations, the appropriate 
procedure would install the Western constitutional system within the context of 
traditional values. The primary step needed to reconcile the two systems is to 
realize the fact that, although there is tension between the two systems, they 
are not fundamentally incompatible. Rather than being alien to liberal values, 
as has been indicated earlier, African traditional institutions have their own 
features that could serve as the foundation to build a democratic system of 
governance. Traditional institutions that largely work on principles of 
consensus and reconciliation could serve as the foundation to build democratic 
transitions in Africa.95 Particularly, through a system of decentralization, there 
are opportunities for creating conducive environments to expand the role of 
traditional institutions at the local level. Once the traditional and modern 
institutions are fully reconciled, and once state building is more developed, the 
effective institutions of democracy are likely to evolve.96 
In light of this comprehensive approach, different African countries have 
adopted diverse forms of legal pluralism to accommodate the informal 
traditional institutions. The first approach, adopted in countries such as Ghana 
and Uganda, incorporated traditional authorities into the governance structure 
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with a largely advisory role.97 In addition to recognizing the institution of The 
Chieftaincy, the Ghanaian Constitution established a National House of Chiefs 
that has wide responsibilities in determining the role of traditional chiefs, the 
interpretation and codification of customary law, the elimination of customs 
and usages that are outmoded and socially harmful, and additional roles related 
to regulating traditional institutions.98 In Uganda, “[s]ubject to the provisions 
of the constitution, the institution of traditional leader . . . may exist in any area 
of Uganda in accordance with the culture, customs and traditions or wishes and 
aspirations of the people to whom it applies.”99 In particular, the restoration of 
the Buganda Kingdom in 1993 significantly resurrected the role of traditional 
institutions in Uganda.100 In the last two decades, “[w]ith a king, a parliament 
[that included clan elders], a government, an administrative structure, 
buildings, representatives deep in the country and abroad . . . the Buganda 
kingdom has by and large acquired or recovered most of the political 
institutions which characterise states . . . .”101 Though such an approach has 
helped these countries to maintain traditional values, the role of traditional 
councils has been limited to advisory rather than having vital decision-making 
power.102 Thus, there has to be more political commitment to expand the 
horizon of legal pluralism whereby traditional institutions play a significant 
role in discharging their responsibilities. 
A second approach, initiated by post-apartheid South Africa, incorporated 
traditional authorities into regional and local governance to avert conflicts 
between the new state and traditional authorities. The recognition of traditional 
leadership and indigenous law was enshrined in the 1996 South African 
Constitution.103 The rights of “Cultural, religious and linguistic communities” 
are enshrined in Article 31 of the South African Constitution.104 There are two 
distinct rights recognized by this section. The first is the right of communities 
to actively enjoy, practice, and use their culture, religion, or language.105 The 
second is the right to “form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society.”106 The Constitution further 
deals with the recognition of traditional leaders and outlines their role, but, 
most importantly, it allocates to them the power to deal with matters pertaining 
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to African customary law and the communities that observe this law.107 The 
various aspects of the traditional institutions in the Republic of South Africa is 
enumerated as follows by a scholar who studied the revival of traditional 
institutions in the country: 
This recognition would among other things entail the right to a salary paid by 
the government, to adjudicate certain disputes according to customary law and 
to representation at various levels of government. [In addition to this], 
[p]rovision is made for the establishment of a House of Traditional Leaders . . . 
in each province which has traditional leaders and the establishment of a 
Council of Traditional Leaders at [the] national level. Each House of 
Traditional Leaders is empowered to advise its provincial legislature on 
matters relating to indigenous law, tradition and custom, while the Council of 
Traditional Leaders is empowered to advise the national government on the 
same matters.108 
A third approach that has been undertaken by countries such as Botswana 
and Somaliland is by far more successful than the previous two approaches. In 
these countries, traditional institutions have been granted wider decision-
making powers. For example, in Botswana, “the traditional . . . chieftainship 
has been retained . . . after independence, and the traditional structures were 
given recognition and authority.”109 By recognizing the traditional 
chieftainship, “the government . . . realiz[ed] that the people in rural areas 
continue to have respect for and faith in the traditional structures.”110 In 
addition to creating a House of Chiefs, Botswana utilizes traditional leaders in 
various capacities, including in its judiciary.111 The traditional chief has a 
number of powers such as promoting the welfare of the members of his tribe, 
determining questions of tribal membership, arranging tribal ceremonies, and 
preventing the commission of offences within his tribal territory.112 The House 
of Chiefs also serves as a forum for the traditional leaders to make their 
contribution on matters of interest to them or their tribes.113 Customary courts 
in Botswana play a significant role in rendering justice to the community: 
One of the most significant roles of traditional leaders in Botswana is in 
imparting justice on customary lines through the customary courts. The 
customary courts handle approximately 80% of criminal cases and 90% of 
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civil cases in the country [and] [t]hese courts are popular in the rural areas, as 
these are easily accessible, fast and comprehensible to the ordinary people.114 
Somaliland’s approach attempts “to fuse the traditional community-based 
consensual system of decision making with the modern institutions of 
democracy.”115 In Somaliland, traditional institutions share power with the 
formal government structure.116 With respect to the role of traditional leaders 
in legislative organs, “[t]he country’s House of Elders (the Guurti), a 
representative body of all of Somaliland’s clans, reviews the laws passed by 
the House of Representatives . . . and acts as a constraint on the powers of the 
executive.”117 In addition to this, the Guurti has other powers, including 
enacting laws concerning religion, culture, and peace; assisting and advising 
the government; and enquiring into the performance of the government’s 
duties.118 The role of traditional leaders, “[t]he modern judicial system and the 
traditional court of clan [] elders also complement each other.”119 Additionally, 
“[t]he governance structure at the center is replicated at the regional level, 
where representatives selected through multi-party municipal elections operate 
in tandem with traditional regional councils.”120 For over a decade now, 
Somaliland has been an island of relative peace in the volatile Horn of Africa 
region due to such a comprehensive approach used to integrate traditional 
systems into the formal constitutional structures.121 
In light of the significance of traditional institutions in Africa, attempts 
undertaken by some countries to accommodate the traditional are 
commendable. However, many other countries in Africa have failed not only to 
recognize the role of traditional institutions, but also may ultimately fail to 
develop vibrant transitional institutions that may bring about a viable transition 
to democracy in Africa. More political commitment, research, and reform are 
needed to transform the role of African traditional institutions in the twenty-
first century. Such an integrated approach is essential to transforming African 
democracy, which has been slow to develop because of the unmerited loyalty 
to Western institutional models without providing proper attention to 
indigenous traditional institutions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The constitutional development process in Africa has been caught between 
two institutional systems. On the one hand, Africa has entrenched pre-colonial 
traditional institutions whose existence transcends the colonial legacy.122 These 
traditional institutions still play significant roles in the lives millions of 
ordinary Africans. On the other hand, African elites resorted to adopting the 
constitutional models of their former colonizers after the independence of 
Africa from colonial rule.123 Despite the adoption of Western institutions, 
many of the African ruling elites discourage development of a democratic 
system of government by arguing that the Western conception of liberal 
democracy is alien to the African egalitarian traditional system.124 Thus, 
African ruling elites were not loyal to either the traditional institutions or the 
modern state structures imported from Europe. This has created a governance 
crisis in Africa whereby the continent is plagued by authoritarian regimes, 
violation of human rights, poverty, and corruption.125 
In light of such compelling challenges, the way forward to improve 
African governance is to find mechanisms of reconciling the formal and 
informal institutional systems that have always been considered antagonistic. 
The primary step needed to reconcile the systems is to realize the fact that, 
though there is tension between the two systems, they are not necessarily 
incompatible. Rather than being alien to liberal values, African traditional 
institutions have their own characteristics that could serve as a foundation to 
build democratic systems of government. Particularly, African traditional 
institutions that largely work on principles of consensus and reconciliation 
could serve as a foundation to build democratic transformation in Africa. To 
achieve the goal of reconciling the two divergent systems of institutions, 
African legal systems need to adopt principles of legal pluralism, whereby the 
formal and informal institutions work together to achieve a transition to 
democracy. Such a transitional arrangement of reconciling the two parallel 
institutional systems is a more realistic option available to African countries to 
build a vibrant democratic tradition. 
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